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Abstract. Typically, recommender systems focus solely on individual
preferences of users or small groups of users, but recommendations can
have effects on the wider social structure. Social considerations are there-
fore necessary in recommendation generation. In this paper, we identify
gaps in literature relevant to socially responsible recommendation sys-
tems, and present a number of challenges. Finally, we present a vision
for an architecture capable of generating socially responsible recommen-
dations and encouraging their acceptance via incentives and rationales.
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1 Introduction
Existing research in recommender systems has typically focussed on the pref-
erences of individuals and small groups of users, and do not account for social
constraints and policies at other levels within the community that are essen-
tial to improve social welfare. For example, in a transportation recommender
system, a user may own both a bicycle and a car, but have particular goals,
preferences, or constraints for a journey. They may need to arrive within 30
minutes (a hard constraint), but they may also prefer to minimise physical ac-
tivity (a soft constraint). If both cycling and driving enables the user to arrive
within the time limit, driving is the best choice when considering individual
constraints and preferences. From a wider perspective, however, the destination
neighbourhood may have an issue with noise pollution, leading to an emergent
norm of reducing car use after certain hours. Moreover, the local authority may
aim to improve air quality, and discourage car use. Accounting for such goals of
the wider community would entail recommending cycling.
A community may have multiple layers (e.g. national and local governments)
where members in one layer can overrule decisions made in another, causing
complex relationships with conflicting interests and norms of differing granu-
larities. For example, one locality may benefit by encouraging traffic to areas
outside it, but to the detriment of others. Another challenge is encouraging re-
cipients to adopt such socially beneficial recommendations, which may conflict
with their individual preferences. In this paper we elaborate on these challenges,
and present a vision for an architecture capable of producing socially responsi-
ble recommendations, which comply with multi-level rules and norms, and also
encourage their adoption.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a gap analysis
of the literature, leading to the challenges outlined in Section 3. The proposed
architecture is presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 Literature Review and Gap Analysis
In this section, we discuss selected state-of-the-art in areas related to socially
responsible recommender systems, namely aims, constraints, and norms in Sec-
tion 2.1, recommender systems in Section 2.2, and incentivisation in Section 2.3.
In each case we identify gaps to be filled to achieve a socially responsible recom-
mender system.
2.1 Social aims and constraints
Constraints and accepted behaviour patterns within a social structure are re-
ferred to as norms. They help regulate societies, guide the behaviour of indi-
viduals, and facilitate coordination and interactions among them [5]. Recom-
mendations should typically comply with existing norms, unless the aim is to
modify such norms. Norms can be classified into obligations, prohibitions, social
commitments, and social codes [26]. Obligations and prohibitions are created by
authorised agents (not the addressees) in a society, and are usually met with
punishment if violated. By contrast, social commitments are created as a result
of agreements between addressee agents, and may disappear after their fulfilment
and their fulfilment is often rewarded. Finally, social codes are general societal
principles that have neither rewards nor punishments, but compliance rests on
empathy or sympathy towards norm beneficiaries. For example, recycling typi-
cally has no direct reward or punishment associated with it, but a social code
may lead to widespread participation [2].
To formally represent norms and reason about them, logics and formal lan-
guages can be used [23, 8, 26]. Formal representation enables agents to reason
about which norms to comply with, by considering normative goals (what should
be done or avoided), addressees (who should comply), beneficiaries (who bene-
fits), context (where the norm applicable), exceptions (when non-compliance is
not punished), rewards (for compliance), and punishments (for non-compliance).
Frameworks such as that developed by King et al. [10] enable institutions in one
level of a hierarchy (e.g. national government) to check norm compliance at a
lower level (e.g. local council).
While norms exist to benefit a society, autonomous entities may choose to
ignore them if they conflict with their personal goals. To encourage compli-
ance, norm enforcement mechanisms can be used, for example, using education,
promotion by influential peers, or introducing punishments for compliance and
rewards for non-compliance (administered by either peers or dedicated agents).
Posner and Rasmusen [1] discuss different types of sanctions that can help enforce
norms, including automatic sanctions (where reduced coordination cause harm
to the violator), informational sanctions (where undesirable characteristics of
the violator that may damage reputation are revealed), bilateral or multilateral
costly sanction (where a punishment is applied by other members of the soci-
ety), guilt, and shame. With respect to punishment, adaptive mechanisms have
been studied in computational multi-agent systems and proved to be effective,
including both a simple escalating punishment model [6], and more sophisticated
dynamic punishment models [13, 24], where the level of punishment is increased
or decreased in response to agent reaction to that punishment.
In the context of a socially responsible recommender system, various norms
(e.g. societal obligations and conventions), soft and hard constraints, and pref-
erences of various stakeholders, at multiple competing levels of granularity, need
to be considered. With regards to this, the gaps identified are as follows.
– How to formally represent and reason about norms in a multi-level system
with conflicting goals across all levels?
– How to ensure multi-level norm enforcement using influential agents, adap-
tive punishments and rewards?
2.2 Social responsibility in recommendation generation
Recommender systems are used in several domains [12] [18], and are typically
based on content (what a user has liked previously), collaborative filtering (users
with similar preferences), demography (clusters of similar users), knowledge (spe-
cific needs of a user), community (a user’s friends), or a hybrid of these [18]. In
general, recommender systems aim to increase the number of interactions (for
example sales in commerce), or increase user satisfaction. With the exception of
knowledge-based systems and other contextual recommendation systems, there
is little research on generating recommendations within constraints, and in par-
ticular recommendations that aim to achieve social goals.
Group recommender systems, which generate recommendations to satisfy a
group of users rather than individuals [14], have similarities with social recom-
mendation generation. In generating recommendations for a group of users, the
system must consider all their preferences to either maximize fairness or min-
imise overall misery [20] [3] [25], which is a kind of social aim. However, group
recommender systems do not consider individuals outside the group but in the
same society, thus ignoring the wider values. Moreover, in the case of gener-
ating recommendations that aim to achieve social goals, interactions between
recommendations and their side effects must also be considered. In traffic man-
agement, for example, recommendations that motivate users to all take the same
route home may interact and cause a traffic jam. Redirecting some of this traffic
to reduce congestion in one area may inconvenience some individuals to the ben-
efit of the majority, but this diversion may have a side effect and conflict with
a higher level goal of reducing the total number of cars on the road (i.e. lower
congestion levels may encourage more people to drive). A socially responsible
recommender system should consider as many interactions and side effects of
recommendations as possible.
Another aspect of a socially responsible recommender is system accountabil-
ity, for example when giving recommendations that may affect an individual’s
security [12] [21]. Similarly, is it responsible to recommend users’ content similar
to what they have previously read, potentially creating echo chambers? Nguyen
et al. [15] suggest that the creation of echo chambers is natural, and recom-
mender systems based on collaborative filtering may reduce their likelihood, but
this is unlikely to be sufficient in all domains and in the long term. It is also im-
portant to encourage users to follow recommendations (see Section 2.3) as well as
increasing recommendation diversity [15]. An accountable recommender system
should go further than this, however, and provide some guarantees that its rec-
ommendations will assist in achieving a social aim. Recommendations should be
auditable to identify how and why they were generated, and justifications should
be presented to users detailing intended and possible unintended outcomes [11].
Gaps identified regarding social responsible recommendations are as follows.
– How to account for multi-level hard and soft constraints, with multiple stake-
holders?
– How to reason about multi-level side effects of concurrent and consecutive
recommendations?
– How to account for, audit, and justify recommendations?
2.3 Encouraging acceptance of recommendations
Besides recommendation accuracy, user interaction aspects are important to im-
prove effectiveness and acceptance of recommendations [9]. Transparency and
persuasion are particularly important factors for user acceptance, and explana-
tion techniques have been proposed to contribute to both, via exposing the rea-
soning behind a recommendation [22] [16], e.g. ‘use X because ...’. Transparency
and persuasion are of vital importance in socially responsible recommendations,
but become more challenging for a number of reasons. In particular, an explana-
tion should communicate the logic and benefits behind a recommendation, while
reflecting the complex, possibly conflicting, social constraints and polices at var-
ious hierarchical levels. Moreover, since the recommendation may appear sub-
optimal from the perspective of an individual (but beneficial socially), further
encouragement for adoption beyond conventional explanations are also required.
Various economic and psychological studies emphasise the importance of in-
centives in directing an entity towards a desired behaviour [4] [7]. Such studies
reveal that there is typically a mixture of motives driving an entity to undertake
a particular task, which could be intrinsic (e.g. out of personal interest in the
task) or extrinsic (e.g. to gain financial reward or social approval), and may dif-
fer among entities. Targeting such motives with relevant incentives would thus
allow pushing the entity’s behaviour in the desired direction. The applicabil-
ity of such incentivisation in computational systems has been investigated for
multi-agent systems, where researchers have considered the effect of punishment
(in the form of fines) [13], credibility scores [17], violation alerts [24], deferred
reciprocity [19], and reputation [27]. We believe that investigating similar incen-
tives, and their effect on user behaviour, in the context of socially responsible
recommender systems is a promising direction to improve user acceptance.
Gaps identified regarding encouraging recommendations are as follows.
– How to generate transparent rationale or explanation for recommendations
accounting for complex multi-level social goals and constraints?
– What are appropriate intrinsic and extrinsic incentives to influence behaviour?
– How to track recommendation acceptance in complex environments?
3 Challenges
The overarching challenge in creating a socially aware recommender system is to
combine the diverse state-of-the-art for social norms, recommender systems, and
incentivisation, through the lens of fairness, accountability, and transparency. In
addition to addressing the gaps identified above, there are four challenges that
must be overcome.
Social goals, norms, and preferences: A socially responsible system requires
social aims and constraints to be specified. Moreover, because multiple par-
ties may have a social stake in the system, the aims must be structured
to reflect this and represent their differing perspectives, personal goals, and
preferences. In particular, one community may depend on another, e.g. the
services provided in a city comprise the services provided in its boroughs,
and the social goals at the city level may compete with those of individual
boroughs. The challenge is therefore to define a language for specifying a
socially responsible system in terms of soft and hard constraints, preferences
and norms at multiple competing levels of granularity.
Socially responsible recommendation mechanism: Actions in the best in-
terests of an individual may conflict with social aims, system constraints, or
the interests of others. Recommendations considering only the personal in-
terests of an agent, rather than multi-level system aims and constraints,
are therefore not socially responsible. The challenge is to develop a rec-
ommender system that processes the goals, constraints, and preferences to
deliver recommendations aimed at maximising acceptability across all lev-
els. Algorithms for identifying and reasoning with social constraints must be
identified and developed, to ensure the generation of socially valid recom-
mendations that satisfy constraints. A ranking mechanism is then required,
to prioritise the recommendations with the greatest chances of acceptance
and successful implementation. Thus, measures of acceptance and success
are required, both for recommendation ranking and system evaluation.
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Fig. 1. A preliminary architecture for socially responsible recommendations
Incentivisation generation Self-interested entities may ignore socially bene-
ficial recommendations if they conflict with their individual goals and ap-
pear to be sub-optimal. The challenge is then to encourage acceptance of
choices that yield social benefits. To achieve this, it is important to analyse
the requirements of stakeholders, to elicit their goals and perspectives, and
generate relevant incentives. Moreover, since motivational needs may vary
with time, context, and across individuals, the incentive generator must be
equipped with a learning component and provide personalisation and adap-
tation to user behaviours and preferences. For example, while some users may
be motivated by immediate financial incentives (e.g. vouchers), others may
respond more to how their behaviour affects others (e.g. traffic congestion).
Rationale generation To increase the likelihood of individually sub-optimal
recommendations being accepted, it is useful to provide their rationales
alongside other incentives. Rationales should consist of a description of the
model and how its output accounts for context, preferences, and social con-
straints. In addition, rationales should illustrate the intended outcome of the
recommendation, and highlight possible individual and social benefits and
drawbacks. The challenge therefore is to aid incentivisation by generating
rationales that go further than simply explaining model outputs. The ra-
tionale engine must process social aims and constraints, and describe how
adoption of the recommendation can improve society.
4 Proposed Architecture
We envision a socially responsible recommendation framework, as outlined in
Figure 1, which includes a component for each challenge identified in Section 3.
Instantiations of components are to use existing techniques supplemented by
new methods to address the gaps identified in Section 2. Individuals and groups,
with possibly conflicting preferences, goals, and norms at different granularities,
generate a set of hard and soft constraints, social aims, and personal preferences.
The socially responsible recommendation engine will consider all of these factors
by analysing historical feedback and context data to provide recommendations
that are socially beneficial. To encourage adoption of recommendations, they
are accompanied by generated rationales and incentives. Both recommendations
and incentives must be personalised to the changing preferences and contexts of
individuals, thus, this framework allows learning and reasoning about the effect
of recommendations, rationales, and incentives on a individuals’ behaviour.
5 Conclusion
We have considered the state-of-the-art of social norms, recommender systems,
and incentivisation in the context of socially responsible recommendation. We
then identified several gaps that must be filled in order to achieve a socially re-
sponsible recommender system, notably the consideration of complex multi-level
hard and soft social constraints and potentially conflicting aims. We then out-
lined four challenges, namely (i) defining social goals, norms, and preferences, (ii)
generating socially responsible recommendations, (iii) incentivisation, and (iv)
rationale generation. Finally, we proposed an architecture vision for a socially
responsible recommender system, which models a system on multiple levels and
generates recommendations, along with incentives and rationales.
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